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Abstract
Though the growth of broadband has increased dramatically in the last decade,
asymmetric government regulations are impeding its continued growth. The Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) has placed additional regulations on advanced
telecommunications capability services (broadband). This report will show that
asymmetric government regulations have limited the future growth of broadband by
local exchange carriers (LECs1).
Broadband technology has had a significant impact on today's Internet culture
because it has changed the way that we work and use the Internet as a means for
communicating. Most of the broadband regulations only apply to the telephone
incumbents as compared to cable, satellite, and wireless. The contrasting (asymmetric)
regulatory treatment of these services harms consumers, contributing to higher prices,
and in many cases denying them a choice of provider.
It is the intention of this thesis to show how asymmetric regulation has slowed
further broadband growth with regards to incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs)
"last
mile"2
connectivity to consumers. There are changes needed to current policies
that would encourage growth. These guidelines will stimulate competition, promote
capital spending on new broadband technologies, and allow for additional capital
expenditure by the ILECs within broadband. Congress and the FCC should equalize the
regulation of broadband service providers so consumers can obtain the benefits of free
and open competition.
1
LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIER- the term 'local exchange
carrier1
means any person that is engaged in the
provision of telephone exchange service or exchange access. Such term does not include a person insofar as such
person is engaged in the provision of a commercial mobile service under section 332(c), except to the extent that the
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1.0 Introduction
During the past decade there has been a tremendous shift in the way Americans
use the Internet. One of the main technologies that has impacted this is broadband.
Broadband is defined as technologies, which, encompass all evolving high-speed
digital technologies that provide consumers integrated access to voice, high-speed
data, video-on-demand, and interactive delivery
services.1
Deployment of broadband
services holds the promise of increasing consumer benefits and productivity, as well as
developing bandwidth-intensive applications and content. Although broadband services
are being deployed, many experts agree that these investments are not taking place as
fast as they should be and that incentives are needed to spur that investment.
2
In the U.S., asymmetric regulation over broadband providers prevails. A cable
television system operator is not regulated in its sale of cable modem service. In
contrast, an ILEC that offers digital subscriber line (DSL) service faces price regulation
as well as the obligation to offer competitors the use of its broadband network. They
must offer their network on a wholesale or
"unbundled"
basis so in turn they may offer
DSL services in the retail market that compete with the ILECs own retail offering to
consumers.
Such regulation leads not to deregulation, but to an enduring "managed
competition"
far more complex to administer than traditional regulation of a monopoly
service provider ever was. The alternative to asymmetric regulation is either symmetric
regulation or symmetric freedom from regulation, which would create a level playing
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Broadband has evolved from its early beginnings in the 1980s. It started with a
"fast"
speed of 64 Kps and now has speeds up to 8+ Mbps. A brief introduction to the
evolution of broadband will be discussed in section two. In section three, the discussion
focuses on what drives this broadband demand. There are numerous drivers that are
outlined.
As the Internet becomes more and more popular, using it for e-commerce,
downloading music, videos, etc., the need for a faster medium is increasing. The
demand for speed is increasing in both the consumer and business realm. With large
amounts of data being transmitted, there is also a strong need to have the bandwidth
available to perform this function. In section four, the two main types of broadband
technologies are discussed, digital subscriber line (DSL) and cable modems.
The use of broadband has had a tremendous impact on the Internet users way of
life. They tend to spend more time online, do more things, and do them more often
versus dialup users. Broadband users are more likely to conduct transactions online,
download more files, and produce information for the
web.3
The end result is that
broadband contributes to economic growth in different arenas. Broadband has the
potential to add billions of dollars each year to the economy within the next ten
years.4
This translates to the need for more bandwidth. Section five covers the impact that
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Section six covers the two main service providers of broadband that will be
discussed, which are cable and telephony (DSL). While there are other providers,
namely wireless, satellite, and electric, they will only be briefly addressed in this section.
Since telephony regulations are discussed in detail in later sections, section six will be
on the history of cable regulations and how their regulations compare to telephony
(DSL).
In today's market, asymmetric regulation has intervened and slowed the growth
process of this broadband technology. Broadband enables many different patterns of
use that have the potential for dramatic lifestyle changes on both the consumer and
business world. The topics discussed in section seven will include: Telecommunications
Act of 1996, TELRIC (total element long run incremental cost), collocation, and UNE-P
(unbundled network element plan). Steps that should be taken to abolish asymmetric
regulation of ILEC provision of broadband Internet access will also be discussed.
Symmetric regulation will be addressed in section eight. This section will highlight
the positives of having a symmetric regulation across the board to all players involved.
The idea of creating a level playing field will prove beneficial to both consumers and
service providers.
2.0 Evolution of Broadband
What is broadband and how/why did this technology evolve to what it is today?
Broadband, as seen through the eyes of the FCC, is defined as speeds in excess of 200
Kbps (Figure 1), upstream and downstream, over a medium (whether is be cable, wire,
satellite, etc). Broadband technologies, such as fiber optics, have been around for







Figure 1 - Download Speeds of Internet Connections
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) site. (2000).
However, fiber optic technology was mainly limited to one-way direction in
regards to the cable industry and was more of a backbone structure within the
telecommunications industry. Fiber was going to be the main component of the
broadband infrastructure, implemented by companies such as MCI and Sprint.
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) was the first technology that offered
the potential for higher speeds. This was developed in the 1980's by Bell labs and
offered the
"fast"
speed of 64 kilobits per second (Kps). However, the cost to the
consumer was high and the technology never really took off.
The advent of the Worldwide Web (WWW) in 1991 fueled the need for more
speed and, therefore, more bandwidth (the number of binary bits of information
that can
be transmitted per second through a given channel, whether that is copper wire, radio
spectrum, coaxial cable, or optical
fiber).5
3.0 Broadband Demand Market Drivers
3.1 Internet and Internet Users
With the popularity of the Internet in the
decade of the 1990's, the demand for
faster speeds rose exponentially with the Internet.
Former FCC Commissioner William
Kennard had stated, "The most important issue on
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broadband...Broadband is going to change America. ..We want four things for the
consumers in the broadband world. We want fast deployment. We want ubiquitous
deployment. We want competitive deployment. And we want open
deployment."6
The Internet has developed faster than any other technology in the last five years
and shows no signs of slowing down (except for asymmetric regulations). According to
the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Internet ramped up faster than any other
medium in history. It took the television industry 13 years to reach 50 million users;
cable to 10 years and radio took 38 years. The Internet reached 50 million in only 4
years.7
So how can we say that growth has been hindered? Broadband has grown,
however, recent growth has been slowed due to regulations and the fact that
incumbents aren't willing to spend big money on new technologies. (This will be
addressed in section seven).
As the Internet grows, it is also shaping the new economy by allowing
companies, both bricks-n-mortar and virtual, to conduct business no matter
"where"
they
may be located. Electronic commerce (e-commerce) enables consumers and
businesses to conduct transactions on the Internet. However, in order to accommodate
the high number of users, there is a great demand for more Internet
"space"
(bandwidth).
The Internet is a widely used medium that has increased in numbers on a yearly
basis since the 1990's. According to a 2000 DOC census, 51% of U.S. households
(roughly 144 million people) had access to the Internet-which was up from 26%
in1998.8
More than 80% of the households with computers also have Internet access (Figure 2).
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) site. (2000).
3.2 Personal Computers (PCs)
The PC ownership within the U.S. is now at 61% according to a study from the
research firm
Odyssey.9
This is up from 56% in 2000 and from 36.6% in 1997. Why is
this? Well, for one, the price of PCs continues to drop and it now has become more
affordable to buy not only one PC, but also two for the same home. Also, laptops have
become even more popular and a lot of universities now require them for new incoming
freshman.
With the increase in PC consumption, there is a bigger demand for faster
speeds, hence the need for more broadband services. According to Odyssey, the
reason that the penetration rate isn't higher is that many people believe that at this time
they simply don't need a PC. A reason for this may be that high-speed access isn't
available to them, which would lead to the discussion of whether the concept of
universal service is actually working.
Another reason why PC owners demand broadband service is that over 30% of
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is growing faster than the number of single-PC homes. This is a major driver in the need
for broadband. Broadband allows a single home to share the same broadband
connection without compromising the speed.
This is where the demand for broadband and its benefits to users weighs in. In a
2001 broadband study by Arbitron:
? People with broadband Internet access are bigger consumers of electronic media
and entertainment. Compared to the average household, Americans with
broadband access spend 22% more total time with electronic media.
? Nearly half (46%) of people in broadband homes say they are buying things
online more since they got the service.
? Broadband catapults the Internet to a media time spent position on par with
television and radio. The average American spends 33%of his or her electronic
media time each day with television, versus 28%with radio and 1 1%with the
Internet. In broadband homes, the Internet 's share of media time surges to 21%,
equivalent to television and radio at 24% and 21%,
respectively.10
4.0Broadband Access
As Internet becomes more and more popular, using it for e-commerce,
downloading music, videos, etc., the need for a faster medium is increasing. The
demand for speed is increasing in both the consumer and business realm. With large
amounts of data being transmitted, there is also a strong need to have the bandwidth
available to perform this function. What needs to be addressed here is how regulation(s)







4.1 Types of Broadband Service
It is important to understand the two main types of broadband service that are
affected by regulation in the United States. Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and cable
modems are the two most popular (Figure 3). In the U.S., DSL is offered in most areas
by Incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) over their networks; and by broadband
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) who typically rent network elements from
ILECs at prices set by regulation at below their economic
costs.11





DCable ODSL D other telephony D satellite/wireless
Source: Carriere, Richard; Rose, John; Sirois, Luc; Turcotte, Nicolas &
Zabbal, Christian. Broadband Changes Everything. (2000)
Competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) are able to rent unbundled network
elements (UNE) on the ILEC networks. The prices for these unbundled elements
are set
by regulation; this is done by the FCC via the
Telecommunications Act of 1996-at
wholesale prices, which are below costs. Broadband
Internet access is also offered over
cable Hybrid Fiber Coax (HFC) networks. The cable operators are unregulated and do
not share their network with competing firms. A brief
description of each follows.
4.1.1 Digital Subscriber Line (DSL)
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) technology utilizes unused frequencies on
copper
telephone lines to carry traffic at
multi-megabit speeds. DSL is an "always
on"
technology that carries voice and data over the
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the central office of a local telephone company. Like any technology, DSL presents its
own advantages and disadvantages.
DSL is advantageous in that the user can leave an Internet connection on and
still use the phone line for voice calls. DSL operates at a speed faster than a regular
modem connection-up to 8+Mbps versus 56Kbps. DSL does not command new wiring-it
uses existing telephone lines. DSL, however, offers better quality when the user is
closer to the central office of the provider. DSL also receives data quicker than it sends
it and the service is not available everywhere.
DSL delivers applications that are bandwidth-intensive, such as streaming video,
online games, application programs, and video conferencing. Another main advantage
of DSL over cable is that it is a more secure connection. This is because the line from
the CO to the customer's house is dedicated and not a shared medium. As we
discussed with cable, cable is a shared medium, which is easily subjected to breaches
in security.
Digital subscriber line technology is a copper-loop transmission technology that
solves the bottleneck problem often associated with the last mile between network
service providers and the users of those network services. DSL technology achieves
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While DSL technology offers dramatic speed improvements (up to 8+ Mbps)
compared to other network access methods, the real strength of DSL-based services
lies in the opportunities driven by:
a Multimedia applications required by today's network users
a Performance and reliability
?
Economics12
The disadvantages of DSL are that it is limited in distance to 1 8,000 cable feet
from the central office (CO) to the consumers home. DSL does not work (or work well) if
the copper segment exceeds approximately 3-3.5 miles, which encompasses about
25-
35% of ILEC customers. Also, DSL cannot be provided where digital loop carrier
technology (fiber optic cable) has been employed. (Recent technologies are opening up
this area).
There also needs to be a
"clean"
line from the central office to the
customers'
premises. This means that there can't be anything added to the line that would interfere
with the high frequency signal. This may encompass items such as a load coil (an
amplifier that is used to boost the signal of the telephone signal). A bridge tap
essentially splits the telephone line to provide an extra
(second line) at a customer's
house.
4.1.2 Cable Modems
The first industry that offered interactive service was cable-multiple system
operators (MSOs). Since this industry was deregulated (and today still is) cable
companies found it essential to invest in this new technology as a way to stay ahead of
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Cable modems share a similarity with DSL in that they also provide high speed
and an always-on condition. Cable modems operate on digital cable networks supplying
cable television services. Cable providers are also capable of very high data exchange
rates.
Like DSL, a frequency division-multiplexing scheme is also used for high-speed
cable modem data access. Cable modems send data in a 6 MHz channel allotment
whose center frequency sits in a band that extends from 5 MHz to 42 MHz. The data
travels upstream in a reverse path through coaxial cables, amplifiers, and coax/fiber
interfaces called nodes, and optical fiber to the operator's headend, with the headend of
a cable modem connection equivalent to a telephone company CO.
In large systems, data from various areas may be collected at hubs before being
passed along to a regional headend-similar to a telephone company's central office.
While at the headend, data is routed into and out of the local network and Internet
through a cable modem termination system, or CMTS. This same CMTS returns data to
the modem through the same path but at a channel allotment situated at a higher
frequency (normally above 50 MHz.) with the data then heads downstream in a forward
path, which the cable modem receives at the higher
frequency.13
At the end of 1999, there were about 1.5 million cable-modem subscribers, and
cable companies were adding more than 2,500 subscribers
per day. In late 1999,
America Online and Time Warner agreed to merge, validating and at the same time
intensifying the push for interactive cable
services.14
This number is expected to be
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4.1.3 Other Broadband Providers
4.1.3.1 Wireless
There are different systems that take advantage of the wireless form of
communication to make broadband available. The most common that are used now are
fixed wireless and satellite. However, with new technologies of third-generation (3G)
cellular service, mobile wireless will figure to become a popular broadband medium in
the years to come.
Fixed wireless services provide connectivity from a base station to a fixed
stationary point, such as a home or office building. Connectivity may be either to a
single gateway within the home (which in turn is connected through a home network to
computers within the home) or directly to individual computers within the
home.16
The spectrums that are allocated for fixed wireless are called local multipoint
distribution services (LMDS), which has a spectrum located above 20 GHz.
Multichannel distribution services (MMDS) has a spectrum in between
2.1- and 2.5- to
2.7 GHz bands. LMDS is generally allocated for point-to-point voice, data, or video
transmissions. MMDS was used to provide wireless cable video services that would
include educational and instructional programming.
However, in 1998 the FCC issued a rule change that allowed two-way data
service delivery over the MMDS
frequencies.17
This allowed MMDS operators to offer
wireless return transmission of voice, video and data. As a result, MMDS operators
have the ability to provide bi-directional
high-speed Internet access and other data
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Satellite technology allows for the use of a technology that has been around for
many years. It is possible with the use of geo-synchronous Earth orbit (GEO) satellites.
With the use of digital broadcast satellite (DBS),
satellites'
one-way broadband
technology has evolved during the 1990s.
There are technologies that are being worked on to improve bi-directional
broadband service. This two-way service is now available, however, it is much more
costly than the current DSL and cable modem technologies. An example of this would
be a company called Blastsurf.com that provides two-way satellite service for
$99/month. If you choose to pay for the hardware and installation upfront, then the
charge is $579.98 upfront,
$59.99/month.18
The monthly cost for DSL and cable service
range in the $40-$60/month and modems can be bought for under $100.
4.1.3.2 Electric Lines
Broadband over Power Line (BPL) is this latest technology that is set forth to
deliver high-speed services over wire. In April of 2003, the FCC voted unanimously to
conduct a technical review of this technology. "As part of its ongoing effort to promote
spectrum flexibility and access to broadband services for all Americans, and to
encourage multiple platforms for broadband, especially new facilities-based platforms,
the FCC today issued a Notice of Inquiry seeking public comment on using existing
electrical power lines to provide Internet and broadband services to homes and
offices."19
Commission Chair Michael Powell cheered the arrival of BPL as a "monumental
breakthrough in
technology,"
and predicted several other broadband options, such as
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freedom to access broadband services from any room in their home without need to pay




The review would look into whether power line broadband could interfere with
existing radio frequency spectrum devices. The inquiry will also look for appropriate
measurement procedures for testing emissions, which is what the FCC calls
interference, and whether changes are needed in existing FCC technical rules to foster
the development of BPL.
Since new digital power line designs use a large frequency range, unlike most
radio frequency devices, the FCC inquiry will look into whether BPL services could
interfere with everything from garage door openers to police radios. The inquiry,
according to the FCC, addresses the two types of BPL: Access and In-House. Access
BPL uses medium voltage (1 ,000 to 40,000 volts) power lines to bring Internet and other
broadband applications to homes and offices. In-House BPL uses existing electric utility
wiring to network computers and printers, as well as smart appliances, within a building.
Some of the benefits that have been mentioned by the FCC:
? BPL would help drive down prices of broadband by adding a third choice for
broadband-DSL and cable being the other two;
a Because of the near ubiquity of power lines, BPL could also bring broadband
services to rural areas that may not have other broadband options;
a Offer speeds up to 20 Mbps-similar to DSL and cable;
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While it's still early to decide what impact BPL will have on the broadband
market, consumers will stand to benefit by being able to choose another broadband
provider.
5.0 Broadband Impact
The use of broadband has had a tremendous impact on the Internet
users'
way
of life. They tend to spend more time online, do more things, and do them more often
versus dialup users. Broadband users are more likely to conduct transactions online,
download more files, and produce information for the web. The end result is that
broadband contributes to economic growth in different arenas. This translates to the
need for more bandwidth.
There are about 13.1 million high-speed users today (second quarter
2002).21
As
the users demand more and more bandwidth, the need for new technologies arises.
The new technologies involve capital spending by the providers, mainly the incumbent
local exchange carriers (ILECs) and cable companies.
What will be discussed in this section are how broadband impacts the users of
the Internet, on-line behavior of users, and the overall benefits to the economy as a
whole. This will show how broadband has become such an effective and needed
technology and why broadband regulations need to be changed in order to sustain
broadband growth.
5.1 Broadband Users
Broadband allows the user almost unlimited capabilities in relation to what can be
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the demand for higher and faster bandwidth is growing. Broadband Internet users tend
to behave differently as to dial-up (narrowband) users.
In a recent study by Pew Internet in July 2002, roughly 24 million Americans
(21% of all Internet users) have high-speed connections at
home.22
The Pew Internet &
American Life Project's survey of broadband Internet users shows that broadband users
spend more time online, do more things, and do them more often than dial-up Internet
users. According to the study, there are three major ways in which broadband users
distinguish themselves from their dial-up counterparts. For high-speed home users,
broadband lets them use the Internet to:
a Become creators and managers of online content;
a Satisfy a wide range of queries for information, and;
? Engage in multiple Internet activities on a daily basis.
Broadband users also tend to stay on line four times as long as narrowband
users and use more services (Figure 4). This figure is a good illustration as to how







Figure 4 - Broadband v. Narrowband Users
Broadband users are different
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5.2 Effects On The Economy
According to a Brookings Institute report issued in July 2001, "...the universal
adoption of broadband Internet connections by U.S. households could eventually
provide consumers with benefits in the range of $200 billion to $400 billion per year.
Moreover, producers of networking equipment, household computers, ancillary
equipment, and software, and producers and distributors of entertainment products
could also benefit by as much as $100 billion per
year.23
The report also estimates that
widespread, high-speed broadband access will increase our GDP $500 billion annually
by 2006.
With this statement it is easy to see why there is a concern that regulations will
have a negative effect on the growth of the economy. Information Technology is a large
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trickle-down effect on the rest of the economy in the form of jobs, capital spending, and
the like.
In a 2002 review of broadband demand, the U.S. Department of Commerce listed
factors that need to be obtained in order for the U.S. to remain a global technology
leader. Among the factors listed was, "...our ability to maintain a world-class information
infrastructure... there may be no element more critical today than ubiquitous and
affordable high-speed Internet - broadband. The deployment and usage of broadband
networks will significantly impact the global competitiveness of nations and businesses
in the 21st
Century."24
In another study by the New Millennium Group, they predict that building and
using a robust, nationwide network will expand U.S. employment by an estimated 1.2
million new and permanent jobs. These jobs include direct labor associated with
deploying and maintaining broadband investment, direct labor associated with
manufacturing the infrastructure components and consumer premises equipment, and
indirect labor associated with creating services and applications that would ride on
advanced
networks.25
Also, it was found that a failure to improve the performance of broadband could
reduce U.S. productivity growth by 1% per year or
more.26
This takes capital
expenditure on the part of the incumbents and asymmetric regulations take away from
this-as ILECs hold back on building out for fear of having to share their network.
The Information Technology (IT) sector stands to gain the most from the
continued deployment of broadband services. Information technology was the driving







percent of total U.S. productivity (Figure 5) growth and, by increasing GDP without
sparking inflation, enabling the length and




















breadth of the last expansion. About 30
percent of total annual U.S. economic
growth was attributable to information
technology, increasing the growth rate
in 1998,for example, from 3.1 percent to
an extremely robust 4.4
percent.27
There are numerous benefits to
the IT professionals in the U.S., the top
five benefits from a 2002 survey were
listed as:
? Improved productivity (78%)
? Faster desktop access (76%)
? Ability to handle
data- intensive applications (57%)
? Ability to handle more users (53%)
a Ability to handle multimedia (51
%)28
The High Tech Broadband Coalition (HTBC) issued comments on the FCC's
rules on unbundling. Within this document were comments on how broadband will have
positive effects on the economy. Besides the spending aspect of growing broadband
out, there also is the fact the broadband also has the capability
of saving money within
the business sector. One report predicts that companies in 26 industry segments can
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6.0 Broadband Regulations: Cable v. Telephony
The two main service providers of broadband that will be discussed here are
cable and telephony (DSL). While there are other providers, namely wireless, satellite,
and electric, they will not be addressed in this section. Since telephony regulations are
discussed in detail in later sections, the focus will be on the history of cable regulations
and how their regulations compare to telephony (DSL).
6.1 History of Cable Regulations
The Federal government, since 1965, has regulated the cable TV (CATV)
industry, however, the regulations differ from the telecommunications industry. The
premise of this section will be to examine the differences in regulation between these
two entities and provide a brief history of cable regulation in the U.S. A brief timeline of
regulations within the CATV is listed below:
a 1965 - FCC asserts jurisdiction over cable; imposes must carry. FCC First Report
and Order.
a 1968 - US v. Southwestern Cable Co. Supreme Court upholds FCC's jurisdiction
over cable as "reasonably
ancillary"
to Communications Act responsibilities.
a 1 972 - Major policy statement: 1 972 Cable Television Report and Order: codifies
previous rules and imposes regulations concerning (1) signal carriage, (2) access
and non-broadcast activities, (3) technical standards and (4) federal/state/local
arrangements. Third Report and Order.
? 1984 - Amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, the Cable
Communications Policy Act, deregulates rates, eases franchise renewal process,
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? 1 989-90 - Attempts to reregulate cable television results in several bills
introduced into Congress. None pass.
a 1 991 Some reregulation (rates and effective competition) approved by FCC.
Video dial tone authorized.
? 1 992 - Cable Act of 1 992 effectively
"reregulates"
cable.
a 1 996 - The Telecommunications Act of 1 996 passes Congress and is signed into
law by President Clinton. This bill restructures the entire telecommunications
industry.30
The Cable Television Report and Order of 1972 issued new rules that were set in
place to soften some of the restrictions placed on cable for expanding into new markets.
Cable companies were able to deliver more than just local broadcast signals via
microwave. With deregulation coming to the forefront in the 1970's and early 1980's,
there was a huge growth in the number of cable systems. The 3,506 systems, serving
nearly 10 million subscribers in 1975, leaped to 6,600 systems serving nearly 40 million
subscribers just ten years
later.31
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 actually had provisions that
deregulated rate regulation. The companies were able to charge whatever they wanted
for their different tiers of service-they had to show that there were "effective
competition"
for this type of
service.32
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 changed the face of the
telecommunications industry and also had an effect on the cable industry. Rate
regulation for cable services would be eliminated in 1999, except those of the basic tier
(mostly local television signals). This act opened up competition and allowed for the







6.2 Cable v. Telephony
The regulations that govern cable and telecommunications are entirely different.
Figure - 6
Regulations for cable operators vs. local exchange carriers
Local exchange carriers Cable TV operators
Number portability Required Not required
Unbundled actress Required Not required
Interconnection Required Not required
Dialing parity Required Not required
Collocation Required Not required
Regulated depreciation Prescribed Not required







Source: This isa portionol a chart prepared by Roy Neol in his iustirrny Before theHouse TetecoflflrrtunlcabWis Subcom
mittee. May 25, 2000.
(Figure 6)
The local and state
municipalities
administer most of the
regulations on cable.
One of the main
differences is that cable
does not have to offer
their transmission
service to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis. This differs from how
telecommunications industry is regulated. The cable systems are able to maintain
considerable control over the content that is transmitted over their systems.
The courts have upheld the cable industry's First Amendment right to the content
(programs) that they carry (this is what's viewed by the consumer). This has
caused a
huge debate from the telecommunications side in that the Telcom industry has very little
freedom in the content that they provide over their network. This is commonly referred
to "open
access."33
The FCC has opted not to regulate the cable industry (since their signal is mainly
one-way
two-way wasn't originally considered) on
open access, however, the telecom
providers (LECs) must
"unbundle"
their network (also called local loop) to competition.
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the market will provide choice and highlighting some efforts by cable providers such as
AT&T and Time Warner to offer access to multiple ISPs, at least on a trial
basis.34
The
FCC classified cable broadband as an "information
service"3





This means that federal "open
access"
rules that apply to
phone companies do not apply to cable providers.
A policy implication of "open
access"
came to light in the mid-1990s when the
cable authority in Portland, Oregon, tried to assert its right to compel a provider of
broadband to the home in this case a cable system acquired by AT&T to allow any
Internet service provider (ISP) to offer services over its
network.35
Just as telephone
companies, as common carriers, are required to allow any ISP to offer service, cable
providers of Internet services, it was argued, should also have to provide the same
"open
access"
to other ISPs. Fears about monopoly control were part of the debate.
Specifically, some were worried the provider of the broadband connection to the
home could leverage that connection to gain control over the types of information and
services that were provided through that operator's wires. Others were worried that a
lack of open access (via broadband) might not permit users to access to all content on
theWorldwide Web.
Even though cable via the Internet has two-way potential (actually, this is in use
today as cable is able to provide telephony service), the FCC has left regulations to
state and local governments. As discussed above, the cable industry is not regulated in
the same manner as the telecommunications industry (Table 1). Without an open
3
INFORMATION SERVICE- The term Information
service'
means the offering of a capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the
management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the
management of a telecommunications
service. TA96 text, section 3







access policy in place, it would be extremely costly for any competitor to build their own
cable infrastructure to compete with the incumbent(s) in their area. Telecom
companies, on the other hand, are forced to unbundle their networks and allow the
competition to use the very same network.
Table 1.





wireline spectrum that they
use for broadband . . . and
make it available to all comers
at regulated prices.
Yes No




company premises to make it




Must offer their retail
broadband transmission
services to competitors at a
federally mandated discount.
Yes No
Must pay-in to universal
service when they provide
broadband access.
Yes No
Forced to carve-out their
broadband transmission
services into a separate
affiliate as a condition to
gaining regulatory approval of
recent mergers.
Yes No
Source: Gillett, Susan & Tseng, Emy. Asymmetric Regulation on Steroids: U.S. Competition Policy and Fiber to the
Home. (2001).
7.0 Asymmetric Regulations Hinder Growth
In today's market, asymmetric regulation has intervened and slowed the growth
process of this technology. Broadband enables many different patterns of use that have
the potential for dramatic lifestyle changes on both the consumer and business world.
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The regulation of broadband providers is not the same for all providers-hence
asymmetric (Table 2). Telephone companies are heavily regulated while cable and
wireless provides are not regulated. The unevenness of regulation has hindered further
LEC growth of broadband and has tied the hands of incumbents as it relates to capital
infrastructure spending.
Federal regulations of broadband services are based on the identity of the
sen/ice provider. The facilities used to provide DSL services offered by the telephone
companies are subject to the extensive
"unbundling"
requirements that were designed
to let competitors share a phone company's existing voice network. (This is known as
unbundled network element platform-UNE-P).
As Matthew D. Bennett4, Policy Director of the Alliance for Public Technology,
notes, "UNE's are a temporary fix. In the short term, unbundling has encouraged a rise
in competition statistics, but it has done immeasurable damage to the long-term
prospects for deploying advanced services. It has discouraged network upgrades in




Matthew D. Bennett is Policy Director of the Alliance for Public Technology, a non-profit
membership organization concerned
with fostering access to affordable and useable information







Table 2 - U.S. Requirements for support of service-level
Type of Service
Voice Data Video
UNEs, collocation and 3 choices under
resale (TA'96 251 c) TA'96 302
Line sharing, DSL UNEs None ("cable"):
(FCC Report & Orders 3 & just usual
ILEC UNEs, 4) broadcast and
collocation and Separate subsidiary: not programming
resale (TA'96, (merger conditions rules











Incumbent Allow access to require, but FCC can
Type of
Provider
Cable rights of way, (2) MediaOne v. Broward
Operator don't prohibit County: open access violates
1st
None (1984, 92
resale, etc. Amendment cable acts;
("CLEC"
rules: Merger conditions ineffective "leased





Rural telco None (TA'96 None (TA'96 251 f exemptions




Alternative Allow access to






Municipality Unclear whether None (although may be locally None (although
(typically even allowed required, de jureor de facto) may be locally
through
(differing state required, de jureor
electric
..All It-. m\ laws, pending de facto)
utility)
court cases)
Source: Hazlert, Thomas H. Regulation and Vertical Integration in Broadband Access Supply. (2001)
In harsh contrast, facilities used by cable companies to provide cable modem
service aren't subject to regulations or unbundling obligations
- or no open access
5
Cable-telephone cross-ownership restrictions are also lifted for rural telephone
companies. It is speculated that
companies that are already allowed to provide both video and voice services
might be more likely to offer integrated








requirements (this refers to opening up the cable network to competitors). Satellite and
wireless operators offering high-speed Internet access can also do so, free of
regulation.
As stated in the abstract, current regulations harm consumers. Two of the major
areas (highlighted here-discussed in detail in later sections) in which LEC regulations
have an unconstructive effect:
a Limit competition - Since DSL signals get weaker over distance, telephone
companies can't deploy the service farther than three miles from their Central
Offices without making expensive investments in new technologies and network
upgrades. But the old rules governing voice services are being applied to these
new facilities, which creates a huge disincentive to deployment. (As the result of
recent FCC (2003) rulings, UNE does not apply to new investments made by the
LECs. "The uneven playing field created by UNE-P has motivated the incumbent
telephone carriers to scale back almost all network expansion,
'a7
states John
Malone6, president and CEO of Eastern Management Group. However, this is
still being sorted out in the courts with changes not likely until 2004). The result:
beyond the thee-mile radius, cable operators have a virtual monopoly on
broadband services. Consumers get none of the benefits that competition would
otherwise yield.
a Limit the introduction of new technologies - With LECs not spending monies on
new technologies due to forced sharing (UNE-P) of networks, capital expenditure
6
John Malone is President and CEO of Eastern Management Group, one of the oldest and largest
management consulting firms focused exclusively on the communications industry. He provides
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on new technologies is lost. Randolph J. May7, Senior Fellow and Director of
Communications Policy Studies at the Progress and Freedom Foundation writes,
"For if the Commission chooses [Static Regulated Competition] embodying an
indefinite future of 'managed competition', investment in advanced
telecommunications facilities and equipment and innovative new services will be
impaired.
'38
o Streaming video, or the ability to receive video signals the quality of which
is comparable to cable television service is destined to become the next
major application to broadband. Since streaming video has the potential to
make the cable television business obsolete, it is unlikely that cable
operators are going to invest in the research, development and
deployment of new facilities that will undermine their core business.
o These same disincentives to research, development and deployment
-
created by federal regulations
- keeps telephone companies from doing so
as well. In a July 2002 report, Haring and Rohlfs from MIT stated, "the
FCC, through its unbundling policies, has expropriated a valuable call
option from the ILEC and bestowed it on CLECs. As a result, the CLECs,
like holders of call options in general, get much of the upside potential of
the ILECs investments but do not bear the downside risk. The expected
return of the ILECs investment is reduced by precisely the value of this
call option. In this way, unbundling requirements afford a strong
7
Randolph J. May is Senior Fellow and Director of
Communications Policy Studies at the Progress and Freedom
Foundation, a market-oriented think tank that promotes





s Thesis june 26, 2003
investment disincentive for the ILEC. The result will deprive consumers of
access to the new technologies.
,aa
Broadband is shaping the way people work, purchase goods and communicate
via the Internet. There has been substantial growth within the last ten years and this
needs to be able to continue. That means letting the RBOCs spend their big money on
new technology to appease the demand for more bandwidth. Representative Bob
Goodlatte stated that the 1996 Act, "gives new entrants the incentive to build their own
local facilities-based networks, rather than simply repackaging and reselling the local
services of the local telephone company. This is important if the information super
highway is to be truly
competitive."40
This statement was made over seven years ago,
however, it is the basis for what is needed for broadband to continue to grow.
7.1 Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TA96)
The TA96 was implemented to promote competition within the
telecommunications sector. This act enabled competitors of the Regional Bell Operating
Companies (RBOCs) to offer local service within the RBOCs areas and, in theory,
giving consumers a choice for local telephony service (we have seen AT&T, MCI,
Sprint, and others offering local telephone service).
One of the goals of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Section 706 is to
provide broadband in a "reasonable and timely
fashion."41
The act directs the FCC to
take action when this clause isn't being fulfilled. Therein lies the question as to whether
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the
ILEC8
sector. Regulation is not similarly distributed among the broadband
providers-
telephone companies are highly regulated, whereas cable is not.
At the time Congress passed the 1996 Act, the Internet was in its infancy and not
an established medium for business, government, or personal use; however, since then
the Internet has become a prominent feature of the communications landscape. The
objective of section 706 is to encourage the deployment of advanced
telecommunications capabilities (ATCs) "on a reasonable and timely basis... to all
Americans".42
The term "advanced telecommunications
capability"
is defined, without
regard to any transmission media or technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband
telecommunications capability that enables the users to originate and receive
high-
quality voice, data, graphics, and video telecommunications using any
technology.43
Since this act was passed in 1996, the FCC has added more than 10,000 pages
to the Federal Register. In the telecommunications industry, ILECs are highly regulated
by the FCC as compared to the other sectors, i.e. cable, wireless, satellite. The
incumbents are required to unbundled their network elements-the copper lines that run
from the central office to the subscriber are the most common-to competitors at
regulated prices. On the other hand, the cable companies, which also have broadband,
are not subject to the same rules. In order to have a fair and level playing field,
regulations (rules) that are in effect today need to be modified for growth to continue.
Former FCC Commissioner Kennard once stated, "The most important issue on




DEFINITION- For purposes of this section, the term Mncumbent local exchange
carrier'
(ILEC) means, with
respect to an area, the local exchange carrier
that--'
(A) on the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, provided telephone exchange service in such area; and '(B)(i) on
such date of enactment, was deemed to be a
member of the exchange carrier association pursuant to section 69.601(b) of the Commission's regulations (47
C.F.R. 69.601(b)); or '(ii) is a person or entity that, on or after such date of enactment, became a successor or assign
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the FCC has imposed regulations that have hindered the future growth of the LECs
broadband services.
The TA96 was enacted to encourage competition within the telecommunications
industry and to
"deregulate"
the voice infrastructure. However, broadband was just
beginning to develop and the wording of the TA96 doesn't apply to today's technology
that is in place. The aim of the Title II provisions of the Communications Act, as
amended by the 1996 Act, is to enhance consumer welfare by promoting competition in
voice and other basic communications, historically a monopoly industry. Thus,
extending legacy regulation to an ILECs new broadband facilities is not required by
statute and is inconsistent with sound public policy, given that ILECs are not incumbents
in the broadband services market and that Congress did not contemplate such action
when passing the 1996
Act.45
The goals that Congress laid out in the preamble of the act: "to promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality
services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
deployment of new telecommunications
technologies."46
The benefits to consumers
were to be: lower prices, higher quality services, and accelerated deployment of
advanced services (broadband).
Congress viewed competition as a way to achieve these goals, however, they
understood that competition wasn't the only way. Therefore, the included universal
service mandates within the act. Universal service is another way of stating that
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different regulations as they pertain to telecommunications and cable broadband. Some
of the main issues are discussed below.
7.2TELRIC
The FCC sets the wholesale rates via TELRIC (total element long run
incremental cost), which are below the actual costs of many or all of the potential
entrants.47
The TELRIC was established prior to the TA96 and is based on historical
data. Therefore, the rates that have been established are far below the actual costs for
the ILECS to provide these elements. TELRIC regulation attempts to set wholesale
prices based on estimates of current costs with state-of-the-art technology, which are
typically lower than historical costs.
TELRIC is thus the price of a network built from scratch, on a blank slate in the
minds of regulators. The regulators have studied prices and simply know what they
ought to be (or so they think). TELRIC assumes its hypothetical networks would use the
same wire centers, or central offices, as the existing networks of the ILECs. Figure 7
below shows what the hypothetical TELRIC network looks like as compared to what's in














Most Efficient Routes, New Equipment
CostsAre Based onToday's Prices, atMaximum
Discounts, for Most Efficient EquipmentAvailable
Optimal Network Usage
Network Maintained by
Most EfficientMeans of Labor
Real-World Network
Copper
(with bridge taps, load coils, and other devices)
Legacy Telephone Network
Built over Time
Existing Plant Laid Copper. Installed
Switcheswith Variable Life Cycles
Historical Prices Paid for Equipment
Available at the Time of Purchase
Highly Variable Network Usage
NetworkMaintained by
Available Labor atMarket Rates
Source: Thorne (2001)
Excluding the full range of fixed investments from cost recovery thus undermines
infrastructure creation incentives both at the ILECs, who subsidize their competitors to
the extent they make fixed investments, and among the CLECs, to whom regulators
award price discounts so long as they rent rather than
own.48
If the ILEC wanted to offer the competitor a contract for the network element that
has been purchased, it would set a price of the UNE that would be the total investment
cost plus the operating costs each year for the UNE. If demand did not materialize or
prices fell, the new entrant would bear the economic risk of this outcome-the contract
(or regulation) could allow the new entrant to sell the use
of the unbundled element to
another firm if it decided to exit the
business.49
However, the FCC states that the competitor can only purchase the UNE on a
month-to-month basis. This puts all the risk on the ILEC in that if the demand is not








competitor. In this regulation, the ILEC has been required to basically give the
competitor an option that does not force them to purchase the use of the UNEs.
It is clear that the ILECs take the full brunt of this risk (Figure 8) and allows the
competition many advantageous options. It is not hard to see why the ILECs strongly
oppose UNE, thus causing them to reduce capital expenditure within the infrastructure.
In contracts between unregulated telecommunications companies, e.g. long distance
carriers, and their customers; significant discounts are given for multi-year
contracts.50
Figure 8 - ILECS Cost Risk
Historical Cost Recovery
$1 ,000 Loop with a 10-Year Life
I | Return on Investment (10%)








Year Y*ar Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
1 23456^86 10
Source: Thorne (2001)
The example (figure 5) is based on a $1000 loop, which had a ten-year life and a
10 per-cent rate of return on investment. Under TELRIC, the lease price during year one
will be $110, reflecting $100 of depreciation and a $10 return on investment. If nothing







s Thesis June 26, 2003
However, there are always changes. The assumption is that costs are falling by
10 percent each year. At the beginning of year two, it would cost an efficient carrier only
$900 to build the loop that was, in fact, built the previous year for $1000.Under TELRIC,
the lease price in year two is $99, not $1 10 -and the following year the price falls even
further, to $89.10. If prices fall by 10 percent each year for the life of the loop, the
incumbent will not recoup $1 1 00 or even the $1000 it spent to put the loop in place. On
these assumptions, the incumbent will recoup under $720. Even if costs are falling by
only 2.5 percent each year, the incumbent will lose money on this loop. This conclusion
can be generalized: under TELRIC, the incumbent loses money on every investment it
makes in something the Commission has defined as a
UNE.51
The issue has been in the courts since 1999, with the ILECs stating that the
TELRIC calculations should use the historical costs incurred by the incumbents in
constructing and maintaining the networks, which are estimated to be a lot higher.
However, in July 2002, the Supreme Court upheld TELRIC's application formula by a
5-
3 decision. The opinion focused on the possible interpretations for the term
"costs,"
finding that a forward-looking interpretation put forth by the FCC was within the mandate




There have been numerous studies that show how TELRIC has hindered the
ILECs recovery of their network investments. One study
looked at the effects on
technical change and found that low TELRIC prices discouraged
investment.53
Another
study calculated that TELRIC costs





There is also a study showed that UNE
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finding was validated in subsequent studies, which concluded that UNE prices needed
to be as much as doubled in order to encourage investment and
innovation.56
Another analysis from The Progress and Freedom Foundation compared UNE
revenues to retail end-user revenues and concluded that UNEs give the ILECs only
42% of the revenue they would have received from their retail
operations.57
Dr. Alfred
Kahn of Cornell University found that, in effect, it would take 20 years of productivity-
based price reductions to reach the one-time effect of an immediate shift to TELRIC
prices.58
7.3Collocation
This aspect of the TA96 relates to ILECs sharing their physical locations with the
competition. This is property that is actually ILEC owned; yet they are required to
provide space to the competition at no cost. According to the act9, the reason for
providing this space to the competition is, "necessary for interconnection or access to
unbundled network elements at the premises of the local exchange
carrier."59
Under the TA96, the ILECs are required to provide space and all the necessary
elements needed to support the equipment, i.e. HVAC systems, power, cabling, and
even remove asbestos if necessary. Along with these requirements, in 1999 Congress
expanded on these and added more. This included providing a
"cageless"
environment
(Figure 9), which enabled competitors not only to intermingle their equipment but also to
place that equipment in any available space in an incumbent 's
premises.60
9 COLLOCATION- The duty to provide, on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory, for physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled
network elements at the premises of the local exchange carrier, except that the carrier may provide for virtual
collocation if the local exchange carrier demonstrates to the State commission that physical collocation is not






















In March 2000, the D.C. Circuit court has found that the FCC's collocation
regulations have exceeded the planned approach in the TA96. The Court of Appeals
held that the FCC's definition of
"necessary,"







As of 1999, the FCC Order required the ILECs to:
1 . permit collocation of any equipment that is "used or
useful"
for either
interconnection or access to unbundled network elements, regardless of other
functionalities inherent is such equipment;
2. offer competitors both caged and cageless collocation;
3. offer collocation space on both the
ILECs'
central offices and in adjacent
controlled environmental vaults or similar structures;
4. to the extent technically feasible, provide competitors with the option of
collocating the equipment in any unused space within the
ILECs'
premises;
5. refrain from imposing unreasonable minimum space requirements on competitors
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6. bear the initial costs of preparing collocation space for their competitors, as
opposed to requiring the first competitor to collocate at the facility to bear the
entire cost of preparing new collocation space as an up-front
charge.62
However, with their ruling in 2000, the Court of Appeals (COA) made some
changes as to what regulatory power the FCC has and how it is now defined. The COA
eliminated items 1 and 4 as stated above. They also ruled that the ILECs do not have to
collocate any equipment that is not
"necessary"
for either interconnection or access to
unbundled network elements. They also rejected the FCC's directive that the competitor
is allowed to choose the physical location within ILECs location to position their
equipment.
Collocation regulations hinder the growth of broadband infrastructure. Item
number six above states that the ILECs must "bear the initial costs of preparing
collocation space for their
competitors."
This takes away from the spending that would
be done on updating their technologies with modern equipment. The FCC again is
forcing money away from the growth and allowing the competition to gain access to key
physical locations at very little cost.
7.4 Unbundled Network Element Platform (UNE-P)
This section carries the most weight in the argument against asymmetric
regulation. The 1996 Act (section 251) requires incumbent local carriers to allow
competitive local exchange carriers (LECs) to interconnect their networks to the
incumbents.63
DSL was classified as a "telecommunications
service"
by the FCC, hence
ILECs were/are obliged to make available their DSL facilities (e.g., DSL Access
Multiplexers (DSLAMs) to data local exchange carriers (DLECs), though some







In other words, this means that the incumbent carriers (i.e. Verizon, SBC) have
to share their networks-infrastructure-with the new competition. This means the
competition does not have to build their own network since they can use the incumbents
at a discounted price. They (ILECs) must
"unbundle"10
and lease their network
elements11
at wholesale prices. The regulatory discount for ordinary resale is typically
20-25 percent; the UNE-P typically prices out at a discount of closer to 60-65 percent.
(Figure 10).
Figure 10 - UNE-P v. Resale
UNE Platform





















UNBUNDLED ACCESS- The duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a
telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically
feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the
terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252. An incumbent local
exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to
combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service. TA96 text. Section 251 , c3.
11
NETWORK ELEMENT- a facility or equipment used in the provision of a telecommunications service. Such term
also includes features, functions, and capabilities that are provided by means of such facility or equipment, including
subscriber numbers, databases, signaling systems, and information sufficient for billing and collection or used in the









Network elements like local loops and access multiplexers (a device that
combines several signals for transmission over a single medium) are provided on an
unbundled basis if they are made available individually and in a manner that allows
requesting carriers/users to combine such elements in order to provide
telecommunications services, that is they have to be adequately supported by the
provider.64
From the incumbent's standpoint, they have to open their network to the
competition with very little compensation in return. The FCC identified seven network
elements that are subjected to the unbundling regulations (figure 11).





























The UNE-P prices have had a negative effect on the incumbents, especially in
the telecommunications industry. Rather than make unbundling the direct stepping
stone to deregulation, as Congress intended, the FCC has instead transformed it into a
mountain of new regulation (roughly 10,000 pages worth to the Federal Registry). It
would seem the FCC has taken these steps to benefit the smaller competitors that
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Since TELRIC and UNE-P rates have been established at lower than cost prices,
the expectation that such terms will be set by regulation creates a risk premium for new
investment-thus hindering growth. This provides an additional investment disincentive,
one likely to be highest in a market exhibiting high (and volatile) growth rates, uncertain
product demand, and unsettled
technology.65
7.4.1 Disincentive to Invest in Broadband
One of the FCC's objectives of the deployment of broadband is to "encourage
and facilitate an environment that stimulates investment and innovation in broadband
technology and
services."66
However, UNE regulations have kept the monies that
broadband providers would spend on deployment of new technologies and kept it in
their pockets. In a study done by Strategic Policy Research (SPR), they stated
unbundling requirements are poor public policy for risky services:
a Regulators cannot (and should not try to) get into the micro-management of investment
decisions of a regulated firm. Consequently, they must rely on the firm to make sound
choices with regard to investments. Ideally, the firm will make risky investments that are
cost-effective, evaluated ex ante; it will reject risky investments that are not
cost-
effective, evaluated ex ante.
? The firm is likely to make sound investment decisions if, but only if, its incentives are
structured properly. The incentive structure that leads to sound decisions with regard to
risky investments is for the firm
to reap the full consequences
of its investment
decisions whether positive or negative.
q Unbundling requirements prevent the regulated firm
from reaping the full positive
consequences of its investment decision if the investment turns out to be profitable. In
that case, competitors can purchase unbundled
components and erode the regulated
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This is key in that in order for broadband deployment to grow, positive incentives
need to be there for incumbents to build out their networks. The disincentives have a
greater effect on the ILECs when it comes to advancements in mass DSL deployment.
As Figure 12 indicates, cable modem services are, by far, the dominant provider of
high-speed Internet services, accounting for 64% to 75% of the market share for high
speed services to residential consumers.
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As has been discussed in section four, DSL is limited to a certain amount of
households. In order for growth to continue, capital expenditures need to be made by:
? Installing new fiber-optic cables and systems (together with investments in
constructing remote terminals);
? Upgrading existing fiber-optic systems so that they can accommodate DSL (under a
February 2003 ruling, the FCC Eliminated the requirement for incumbent
local-
exchange carriers (ILECs) to unbundle loops using fiber facilities. The decision
primarily affects consumers, Internet service providers and data LECs.-this is still in
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? Upgrading existing copper cables to enable them to carry DSL.
The expenditures that need to be made by ILECs are extensive. UNE forces
them to share these expenditures with the CLECs and assume all the risk. Without any
significant compensation to the ILECs, the incentive to invest in new infrastructure is not
there. The SPR study concluded that unbundling requirements afford severe
disincentives for ILEC infrastructure investments to support mass DSL deployment. The
most likely result of those requirements is that ILECs will not make those investments
and thereby cede a large part of the broadband market to monopoly provision by cable.
The amount of deterred ILEC investment will probably be approximately $20 billion or
more.68
In a 2002 report, the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (CSTB)
& National Research Council issued their recommendations for continued growth of
broadband. They found that many current policies are flawed. In regards to incentives
for investment, they recommended:
? Recommendation 4.3. Relax federal, state, and local rules to ease market entry or to
69
stimulate investment.
o Provide relief from certain forms of regulation, such as mandated access in
exchange for specified deployments of new or upgraded facilities.
o Reduce the business risk associated with facilities construction by providing
assurances that compensation would be provided for future regulatory imposition
of unbundling requirements.




o Examples of this would include tax credits given for building out infrastructure in
underserved areas, or;
o Incentives-including tax credits and changes in permitting and zoning rules-given
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performance targets or that make investments in training and support of
developers and users.
o Provide government-guaranteed loans for infrastructure upgrades and build-out
in high-cost areas.
In 2001
, the Telecommunications Industry Association
(TIA)12
issued its replies to
the Third Notice of
Inquiry13
set for by the FCC. In section IV of TIA's comments, they
stated that "the commission must act to remove regulatory barriers that are slowing the
deployment of advanced telecommunications
capability."71
The TIA believes that current regulations are impeding investment in facilities
that would promote broadband infrastructure growth. The specifics of their findings
include:
? The Commission take "immediate
action"
to encourage the deployment of facilities
capable of supporting advanced telecommunications capability.
a It is critical for the ILECs to make the investments needed to equip their networks with
the capability to meet the increasing demand for broadband connectivity. And an
upgraded telecommunications infrastructure is essential to its usability as an important
competitive alternative to the high-speed networks of cable operators, the other primary
communications
"pipe"
into most American homes at this point in time.
? ILECs clearly are hesitating to upgrade their networks to enable remote subscribers to
have access to DSL services at least in part because of regulatory obligations and
uncertainty surrounding unbundling, pricing, and collocation obligations.
? ILECs continue to lay copper in new builds and total plant rehabilitations when
bandwidth-rich fiber solutions can be deployed at cost parity. This investment behavior
12
TIA is the principal industry voice for communications and information technology manufacturers and suppliers.
13
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable
and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment. Pursuant to Section 706 of the
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also appears to be due at least in part to the unbundling, resale, and pricing rules that
reduce the ILECs return on investment and increase their risks, thereby undermining the
incentive to
innovate.72
The TIA concluded that the FCC should seek to remove any regulatory obstacles
that stand in the way of deployment of new broadband technologies. They also stated
how UNE encourages disincentives and should exempt any new investment from UNE
regulations.
8.0 Symmetric Regulation of Broadband
While asymmetric regulation hinders growth, symmetric regulation would seek to
level the playing field and promote growth according to a 2002 conclusion by 43
economist.73
Symmetric here does not mean to apply the same rules to cable system
operators (CSO) that are now applied to ILECs. There needs to be standards set that
are fair both to the ILECs/CSOs and also to the CLECs.
The FCC has deemed the ILECs as a "telecommunication
service"
which
warrants regulation under the TA96, whereas CSOs are an "information
service."
The
FCC could remove asymmetric regulation that the agency itself previously imposed.
They could assert that broadband Internet access service is not a
"telecommunications
service,"
but rather an "information
service,"
which is free of such regulations.
When it comes to providing broadband service,
cable and telephone companies-
as well as wireless and satellite companies-are providing an identical product. They are
competing with each other for
customers on price, quality, and services. Cable and
telephone companies provide broadband service over old
wires. These are wires that
were inherited from their prior monopoly status, but
that require substantial investment
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8.1 Symmetric Regulation Spurs Investment
The FCC's regulatory disparities inevitably distort prices and undermine
incentives to invest-disincentives. The costs are especially high in young markets where
technology is evolving fast and customer bases are growing even faster. The FCCs
attempt to drive prices to cost at the beginning of a product cycle eliminates incentives
for companies to enter the market, thereby eliminating options for consumers.
Symmetric regulations would provide a level playing field that would be spur
investment without fear of regulation retribution. As has been discussed in section
seven, current regulations actually dissuade the ILECs to investing in new infrastructure
technologies. The Commission 's decision to impose contrasting rules on broadband
service is not simply a boon to cable companies and CLECS, it constitutes a burden on
ILECS. Ultimately, consumers pay the price and are denied the benefits of innovation.
Unbundling restricts investment so, conversely, having the FCC eliminate the
UNE platform would induce investment. It has been well documented that cable does
not have to comply with the FCC's UNE-P. Cable seems to have
benefited the most
from being non-regulated in that there are almost twice as many cable
modem
subscribers as there are DSL subscribers. (Figure 13) There is a good amount of





















Source: CableDatacomNews, KlnalicSlralegios.Mart* 2002.
Along the same lines, investment in wireless infrastructure has suffered since it's
less expensive for a CLEC to rent the ILECs. This lessens competition and has a
negative effect to the consumer in the form of higher broadband prices. Slow growth in
wireless has been affected by asymmetric and UNE which, in turn, stagnates prices. In
both cases, wireless and DSL, there isn't any incentive to invest in new technologies
and the consequence is a status quo infrastructure.
8.2 Facilities-Based Competition
Facilities-based providers-mainly ILECs-have argued that TA96 was intended to
promote facilities-based competition, so regulatory policies should favor CLECs that
build their own networks. There are zero barriers to entry in any market a
facilities-
based carrier might otherwise enter, but won't, and no protection in markets the
facilities-based carrier has already gone to the trouble to build-out. New facilities-free
carriers can buy UNE-P from the incumbent telephone company at prices the
facilities-
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Broadband competition must be facilities-based. Innovation will be lacking
without strong competition among and within the different platforms. Competitors will
push each other, developing more advanced and comprehensive services. Facilities-
based competition offers more opportunities for consumers to choose a provider that fits
their needs.
The idea of reselling services and dismantling ILEC networks neither
automatically decreases prices for consumers nor provides more choices. Real
competition comes from companies with full service operations that can offer various
service packages that address individual needs and desires. Facilities-based
competition will spur investment in trying to bring advanced services to more
Americans. This is done as competitors seek venues where they can build facilities that
will succeed. In turn, capital expenditures are made within the industry promoting
growth.
The ILECs have become reluctant to invest in advanced telecommunications
capabilities for fear that the FCC will require them to offer the modernized network to
competitors at the TELRIC discount-as mentioned above. The Commission's sole
reliance on UNE resale entry is thus impeding the facilities-based competition
that is
necessary to achieve the ubiquitous
advanced telecommunications deployment that
Section 706 of the '96 Act requires.




dependence on incumbent networks,






Master's Thesis June 26, 2003
Stephen B.
Pociask14
writes, 'The fact is that UNE prices are being set so low they have
effectively become a subsidy for CLECs paid by their competitors, the ILECs.
"76
9.0 Conclusion
The time for symmetrical regulation of broadband has come. Broadband is
playing and will play a key role in the technology economics within the United States
and the rest of the world. The FCC has placed an undue regulatory burden on the
ILECs that has transgressed the future growth of broadband.
Not only has it's (FCC) regulations spurned investment by the ILECs, these same
regulations also have disincentive effects on all other broadband providers. It has been
shown how important broadband has become with regards to Internet use and the
potential uses it brings users. The financial effects that are related to the future growth
of broadband run into the billions of dollars.
The Commission needs to allow all providers a level playing in order for
competition to take place on an even scale. This would allow for the creation of new
and untapped markets. In regulating one entity differently than the others forgoes the
ideal of competition stated in the TA96. The TELRIC and UNE concept are antiquated in
that regulating one segment of the industry has a trickle down
effect to all providers. By
not allowing a more facilities-based competition,
closes the door to future investment
within the broadband structure.
The idea of symmetric regulation of broadband is one the FCC needs to
adopt.
Allowing the current structure to continue only
hinders the future growth of broadband
14
Stephen B. Pociask is President of TeleNomic Research, an economic and
strategic consulting firm focusing in
research on Information Technology, Internet and telecommunications
markets. Over the past 20 years, his studies
have been filed with both federal and state regulatory
commissions. He has appeared before the FCC and testified
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and the positive impacts that will result. It has been shown how symmetric regulations
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